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ESSAYS
A Reply to Cummings: Are the Racial
Realists Forced to Embrace the Legal
Rationale of the Liberal and
Integrationist Structures?
By PROFESSOR KEviN BROWN*
Introduction
I agree with some of what Professor Cummings has written in his
article1. To begin with, I agree with Professor Cummings's assertion that
Brown v. Board of Education2 ("Brown P') was not, and that the constitu-
tionality of gender-segregated education should not be, determined by
social science evidence.3 I also agree that in the school desegregation
context, Brown I has become a "spent force." 4 The Supreme Court's
distinction between de jure segregation and de facto segregation articu-
lated in the 1973 decision Keyes v. School District No. J5 limited the po-
tential of Brown I as a force for change. Not only did the Court's
decision increase the cost of providing the evidentiary support for an
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. B.S. 1978, Indiana University;
J.D. 1982, Yale University.
1. Richard Cummings, All-Male Black Schools: Equal Protection, the New Separatism
and Brown v. Board of Education, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. (published in this issue, 1993).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. I will not explore in depth the call for a Hegelian synthesis found in the conclusion of
Professor Cummings's article, Cummings supra note 1, at n.303 and accompanying text; how-
ever, I will offer a few criticisms. This Hegelian synthesis, allowing the formation of private
African-American Immersion Schools, simply accepts the orthodox liberal dichotomy between
the private and public spheres. Private individuals are granted the right to pursue their own
desires by educating their children in private schools centered around a curriculum that they
deem appropriate. According to U.S. News and World Report, there are now over 350
Afrocentrist private schools serving some 50,000 black children in the United States. Afrocen-
tric Schools: Fighting a Racist Legacy, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, Dec. 9, 1991, 14 74-
75. This Hegelian synthesis is therefore no real synthesis at all, but simply a means of articu-
lating a viable option that already exists for those who can afford it.
4. See Cummings, supra note I, at n.2 and accompanying text.
5. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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equal protection violation, but in some school districts where de facto
segregation existed, it resulted in a finding of no constitutional viola-
tions.6 The Court's subsequent opinion in Milliken v. Bradley7 placed
even greater limits on the potential transformative possibilities of Brown
. When the Court prohibited cross district busing as a means of remedy-
ing de jure segregation,' it eliminated all hope of meaningful desegrega-
tion in most of the country's major urban areas.9 Finally, the Court's
1976 decision in Pasadena Board of Education v. Spangler,1" holding that
it was unnecessary to adjust student assignments to take account of
resegregation, meant that school desegregation decrees would not remain
in effect long enough to make desegregation an accepted fact in our soci-
ety.11 While Brown I has become a spent force, it is not the "New Sepa-
ratists" (the term Professor Cummings uses), or perhaps more accurately
the "Racial Realists," who are responsible.12 The blame (or depending
on your point of view, the credit) for the exhaustion of the integrationist
aspect of the Court's school desegregation jurisprudence must rest firmly
at the door of the architects of its demise-the United States Supreme
Court.
Professor Cummings is correct in his assertion that the Racial Real-
ists are concerned not about gender but about race.13 What is truly at
6. The Keyes decision also led to inconsistent results. For example, at the same time a
federal judge in Grand Rapids, Michigan ruled that establishment of optional attendance
zones, creation of schools in segregated neighborhoods, and assignment of black teachers to
black schools all had permissible explanations, Higgins v. Board of Educ., 395 F. Supp. 444,
464-65, 470-72, 474-78 (W.D. Mich. 1973), aft'd, 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974), a different
federal judge in nearby Kalamazoo, Michigan held similar practices to be unconstitutional,
Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143, 194-201 (W.D. Mich. 1973), affid sub
non. Oliver v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974). On appeal the Sixth
Circuit affirmed both of the lower court opinions.
7. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
8. Id. at 741-45.
9. According to figures published by the United States Department of Education for
1984, 9 of the 10 largest school districts in the United States did not have as large a percentage
of white students as there were in Detroit in 1970 when the District Court concluded that
meaningful desegregation could not take place in Detroit. See THE CONDITION OF EDUCA-
TION, STATISTICAL REPT., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 179 (1987). At that time
white students comprised 34.8% of the student enrollment in Detroit. Bradley v. Milliken,
338 F. Supp. 582, 585-86 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
10. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
11. The Court's holding was implicitly reaffirmed in Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S.
237 (1991) and explicitly reaffirmed in Freeman v. Pitts 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1444-46 (1992).
12. I use the term "Racial Realists" to refer to those who accept the concept of racial
realism articulated by Professor Bell in DERRICK BELL, FACE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE
WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 93-108 (1992). Racial Realism asserts that despite our
best efforts to control or eliminate oppression based on race, it returns in different guises, time
after time. In effect, this theory views racism as permanent.
13. See Cummings, supra note 1, at n.216 and accompanying text.
RACIAL REALISM
issue are the educational initiatives directed towards African Americans,
not just the subcategory of gender-segregated education. 14 Even though
the primary issue is one of race, I also agree with Professor Cummings
that even in areas where the students are predominantly black, separate
schools for males without concomitant and equal facilities for females is
likely to violate the Equal Protection Clause due to gender-based
discrimination. 5
Professor Cummings's legal analysis, however, appears to extend be-
yond the limited question of the constitutionality of All Black Male
Schools ("AMBSs"). At the conclusion of his article he calls for a "syn-
thetic jurisprudence in the Hegelian sense." 6 In this synthetic jurispru-
dence, education directed at cultural integrity for racial, religious, and
ethnic minorities is to be confined to the private sphere. He would there-
fore object to attempts by school officials in a predominantly black school
system to establish either "separate but equal" schools for males and fe-
males on an Afrocentric basis or African-American Immersion Schools
open to both males and females like those currently operating in Detroit,
Milwaukee, and New York.
I. Situating the Racial Realists
Professor Cummings's discussion of the Racial Realists appears to
make an unwarranted assumption. He appears to view them as volunta-
rily choosing racial separation over the alternative of integration.7 The
Racial Realists, however, are not so much choosing racial separation as
they are recognizing the realities of racial separation in America's public
schools. Despite the desires, aspirations, intentions, and efforts of mil-
lions of Americans, the forty-year effort to integrate America's public
schools has failed to accomplish its objective. 8 New reports indicate
14. Currently there are no AMBSs in operation. And the arguments that justify separate
schools for black males could also be used to justify such schools for black females. See Kevin
Brown, Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools?: The Paradoxes Created by Law's
Conception of Race and Public Education, 78 IOWA L. REv. (forthcoming 1993).
15. I found it curious that Professor Cummings would state that the Brown opinion
should not be seen as resting upon social science evidence, Cummings, supra note 1, § I, and
yet criticize the AMBSs because of the feeling of inferiority that would be engendered in Afri-
can-American females. Id. at § VIIF. I agree with his conclusion, that without concomitant
institutions, we do not have an issue of separateness at stake in these academies.
16. See Cummings, supra note 1, at n.303 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 1, nn. 201-221 and accompanying text.
18. This is not to deny that there were significant advances in reducing the amount of
segregation in America's public schools. Much progress occurred in the South. However, a
1980-81 Congressional study found that nearly half of the black students living in the North-
east attended schools that were at least 90% minority and that 63% of black students around
the U.S. attended schools that had a majority of black students. Gary Orfield, Desegregation in
Spring 19931
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that racial separation of our public schools in 1990 was about the same as
it was in 1972.19 Added to persistent racial imbalance are the Supreme
Court's two most significant school desegregation decisions in almost a
decade-Board of Education v. Dowell and Freeman v. Pitts.21 These
decisions, though not wholesale retreats from the commitment to main-
tain desegregation of public schools, have nevertheless set the judicial
stage for the termination of over five hundred school desegregation de-
crees across the country. 22 As federal district courts entertain requests to
terminate court supervision over desegregated student bodies, there will
no longer be any significant institutional forces demanding further deseg-
regation, and the current level of racial imbalance in America's public
schools will almost certainly increase. 23
Given these realities, it is not surprising that those charged with
developing our implementing educational policies are attempting to re-
spond with innovative educational approaches. The Supreme Court's
opinion in Brown I and the subsequent desegregation of public education
ignited an educational reform movement involving the education of Afri-
can-Americans in the 1960s and 1970s.24 That reform movement em-
bodied the assimilationist aspect of the Supreme Court's school
desegregation cases. Not surprisingly, the realization that in most areas
of our country racial separation in our public schools will be a reality for
Public Schools, 1968-1980 Focus 4-5 (October 1982) (a publication of the Joint Center of
Political Studies).
19. Ethnic concentration of Latinos actually increased during the 1980s. GARY ORFIELD
& FRANKLIN MONFORT, STATUS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: THE NEXT GENERATION 1
(Council of Urban Boards of Education, Mar. 1992).
20. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
21. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
22. James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation Explained,
90 COLUM. L. REv. 1463, 1465-6 (1990).
23. Professor Cummings mentions the possibility that state courts may agree to fill the
vacuum being created by the withdrawal of the federal judiciary's commitment to school de-
segregation. See Cummings, supra note 1, at n. 293 and accompanying text. I think it is
unlikely that a policy that could not be successfully implemented by the federal judiciary will
appear attractive to a large number of state supreme courts. It is also possible that such at-
tempts by state courts could be reversed by the voters or legislators in a particular state. See,
e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (striking down a statewide
initiative approved by almost 66% of the voters in the state of Washington that would have
prevented any school board in the state of Washington from maintaining a mandatory school
desegregation plan on its own initiative), and Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982)
(upholding a state constitutional amendment approved in a referendum by the voters of Cali-
fornia that prevented state courts from using mandatory pupil reassignment and busing except
where there was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
24. For a discussion of this reform movement, see Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court
Allowed the Cure for De Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 76-
80 (1992).
RACIAL REALISM
the foreseeable future has ignited another educational reform movement
in the 1990s. 25 The arguments of the Racial Realists should be under-
stood in the context of recognizing that we have already seen the maxi-
mum amount of racial mixing in public schools that will exist in our
lifetimes. Regardless of one's desire to see desegregated schools, it would
be irresponsible if educators did not take account of these realities in
trying to determine the most appropriate educational strategies, tech-
niques, and policies for the students that they are charged with teaching.
The real dilemma facing the Racial Realist, our legal system, and
our society is that in attempting to provide legal justifications for innova-
tive educational programs, educational policymakers are caught in the
legal web of the liberal-integrationist discursive structures that have their
roots in Brown I. The challenge is to see if our legal system will allow the
Racial Realists to transcend the inherent limits of this discourse. Will
our constitutional jurisprudence permit Racial Realists to justify their
decisions to alter the educational programs for African Americans as pri-
marily educational decisions that happen to involve race, as opposed to
race-based decisions?
H. The Liberal and Integrationist Tradition Within the
Supreme Court's De Jure Segregation Jurisprudence
I agree with Professor Cummings's assertion that the liberal and in-
tegrationist structures that dominated American culture in the 1950s
merged to produce the Brown I decision.26 The Court's jurisprudence in
the school desegregation cases incorporated these two conflicting tradi-
tions. By distinguishing the liberal tradition from the integrationist tra-
dition, we can illuminate the conflict between them. A closer
examination will reveal that even though the Racial Realists are not ad-
vocating integration, they are nevertheless attempting to argue that their
educational initiatives fit within the legal rationales flowing from both of
those traditions.
A. The Liberal Tradition
The vision of society implicit in many of the Supreme Court's more
recent Equal Protection Clause decisions generally conceives of society
25. For a collection of articles addressing the Afrocentric Movement, see INFUSION OF
AFRICAN AND AFRICAN AMERICAN CONTENT IN THE SCHOOL CURRICULUM: PROCEED-
INGS OF THE FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE, October 1989 (A.G. Hilliard III et al. eds.,
1990).
26. See Cummings, supra note 1, at § III.
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within the liberal tradition as a collection of knowing individuals.2 7
These "knowing individuals" are viewed as self-directed, coherent, self-
determining, free-willed, integrated, and rational.28 Because these know-
ing individuals are self-determining and free-willed, their attitudes, opin-
ions, and beliefs are not seen as products of various cultural systems of
meaning, but rather as being independently arrived at and freely chosen.
The social action of these knowing individuals is presumed to be con-
trolled by their conscious intent. They are the authors of their own
thoughts, the captains of their own ships, the rulers of their own empires,
and the stewards of their own behavior.
This conceptual structure of society contains its own system of un-
derstanding for interpreting social events and the role of government, the
latter being of particular importance for purposes of this essay. The role
of government within this conception of society is to mediate the conduct
of these knowing individuals so as allow them to pursue their own desires
and to prevent them from unjustly interfering with the rights of their
fellow persons to do the same. Government must therefore strive to
achieve a sort of neutrality, respecting equally each all-knowing individ-
ual's pursuit of various independent objectives. Government should
neither seek to advance the parochial interest of a particular group, nor
fail to treat people as individuals.
Even though children (such as public school students) do not fit the
ontological premise of the knowing individual, government controlled
public schools are still constrained by the requirement of governmental
neutrality. As a result, public schools must still treat students as individ-
uals. When public schools engaged in de jure segregation, however, they
were treating students, teachers, and administrators not as individuals,
but rather as members of racial or ethnic groups. Within the liberal tra-
dition, the harm of de jure segregation could thus be seen as one of three
different variations of the violation of governmental neutrality. First,
public schools were not treating people as individuals. Second, since
whites were generally provided with better equipped and funded schools,
government was also advancing the parochial interest of whites. And
finally, segregation was stigmatizing to African Americans. By segregat-
ing and underfunding the schools that blacks attended, government con-
27. See, e-g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267 (1986); City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); FCC v. Metro Broad-
casting, 497 U.S. 547, 602-610 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
28. See generally Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REv. 167, 181
(1990); Seyla Benhabib, Critical Theory and Postmodernism: On the Interplay of Ethics, Aes-
thetics, and Utopia in Critical Theory, 11 CARDOZO L. Rn'v. 1435 (1990).
veyed the message that African Americans were not worthy of respect.29
Within the liberal tradition, the remedy for these harms is for gov-
ernment to obey the constraint of neutrality which it has violated. Resto-
ration of neutrality is liberalism's limited rallying cry. Within the liberal
tradition, there is a distinction between individuals voluntarily choosing
to separate themselves along racial and ethnic lines and being forced to
do so by government. As long as public schools use race-neutral meth-
ods to determine school attendance at equal schools, including freedom
of choice plans or neighborhood attendance policies, then public schools
are operating within the liberal tradition. However, if government as-
signs students to schools based on race-as was done before Brown-
then government is not treating those students as individuals. Rather
government is treating them as members of a racial group. Conse-
quently, within the liberal tradition, voluntary (de facto) separation is
completely different from government-fostered (de jure) segregation.
In Brown Ih0 the Court placed the primary responsibility on school
authorities "to achieve a system of determining admission to the public
schools on a non-racial basis"3 To fill in the vacuum left by the
Supreme Court's failure to articulate what a nonracial school system
was, many southern federal judges and school officials interpreted the
Brown opinions as relying solely upon the liberal tradition of treating
people as individuals. These judges and school officials relied upon the
dictum in Briggs v. Elliot3 2. In addressing one of the companion cases in
Brown I on remand, the three-judge federal district court panel in South
Carolina interpreting the Court's opinions in Brown wrote:
[The Supreme Court] has not decided that the states must mix per-
sons of different races in the schools or must require them to attend
schools or must deprive them of the right of choosing the schools
they attend. What it has decided, and all that it has decided, is
that a state may not deny to any person on account of race the
right to attend any school it maintains .... The Constitution, in
other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimi-
nation. It does not forbid such desegregation as occurs as the result
of voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of governmental power
to enforce desegregation.33
29. Brown, supra note 24, at 14-17.
30. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
31. Id. at 300-01.
32. 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
33. Id. at 777 (emphasis added).
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B. The Integrationist Tradition
In contrast to the liberal tradition is the integrationist tradition.
Even though the Supreme Court did not mandate desegregation until its
1968 opinion in Green v. New Kent City School Board,3 4 the genesis of the
integrationist tradition can be traced to Brown L Unlike the liberal tradi-
tion, which strives to treat people as individuals, this tradition makes
racial mixing of blacks and whites in public schools the most important
consideration.35 In order to advance integration, government is required
to violate the liberal tradition and treat students as members of racial
groups in order to produce racially integrated schools. To find the justifi-
cations given by the Supreme Court for overriding the liberal tradition in
school desegregation, we must go back to the circumstances that sur-
rounded the Court's choice of racial balancing as the primary means by
which to remedy the harm of de jure segregation.
The resistance in the South to the Court's opinions in Brown I and
Brown 1136 has been documented by a number of scholars.37 Many states
and school systems employed various methods to minimize or avoid
compliance with the constitutional duty.38 In May of 1964, ten years
34. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
35. There has been an effort to harmonize the integrationist tradition with the liberal
tradition. As the argument goes, if everyone treats everyone else as an individual, then color
simply becomes a description of a purely physical attribute. As a result, since people will not
distinguish one another based on color, integration will naturally follow. The reason we are
not at that point in our society today is that government for a long time has made racial
classification an important determinant of rights and responsibilities. As a result, for at least
an interim period of time, the government should take account of race in order to reach the
intergrationists' goal. For a good example of these arguments, see Paul Gewirtz, Choice in
Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 728, 741-59
(1986). Given the persistence of race consciousness in our society, it is clear that in the 1990s
we have not reached the place where race does not matter. Anyone who accepts this argument
must be prepared to override individual choices for a very long time without any demonstrable
evidence that we will ever evolve beyond this period of transition.
36. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
37. See, eg., DIANE RATIVICH, THE TROUBLED CRUSADE: AMERICAN EDUCATION
1945-1980, 133 (1980). Measures passed by southern states included such provisions as:
denial of state funds to schools attended by pupils of different races; threats to close
the public schools in the event they were integrated; delegation of control of the
public schools to the governor or the state legislature, in hopes of frustrating federal
court orders; abolition of compulsory schooling; tuition grants for those who did not
wish to attend integrated schools; criminal penalties for teaching in or attending an
integrated school; [and] firing teachers who advocated desegregation.
Id. For a detailed account of the delays and obstruction in the implementation of the Brown
opinions, see Frank T. Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v.
Board of Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 13-28 (1975).
38. E.g., Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 688 (1963) (invalidating a procedure
which allowed students to transfer from a school where their race was in the minority to a
school where their race was in the majority); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward
after Brown I, only about two percent of the African-American school
children in the South attended school with whites.3 9 Against the back-
ground of continuing massive resistance to the desegregation of public
schools, the Supreme Court in 1968 rendered its opinion in Green v. New
Kent City School Board.' In striking down a "freedom of choice" plan,
the Court placed upon school boards the obligation to achieve racial bal-
ancing without delay. 41 Animating the Court's decision to order racial
balancing was the resistance that the Brown opinions had encountered.42
The Court rejected the argument of the New Kent County School Board
that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require compulsory integra-
tion.43 It responded that "the constitutional rights of Negro school chil-
dren articulated in Brown I permit no less than [integration]; and it was
to this end that Brown 11 commanded school boards to bend their ef-
forts."'  The Court's opinion in Green rested upon two justifications for
ordering integration. First was the existence of widespread lawlessness
and resistance to the Brown opinions by whites. In order to elucidate the
County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (invalidating a scheme by Prince Edward County in which the
county closed its public schools and at the same time contributed grants of public funds to
white children to attend private schools).
39. RATVCH, supra note 37, at 162-63.
40. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
41. Id. at 441-42. Under the "freedom-of-choice" plan, no whites had enrolled in the
black school, and only 15 percent of blacks had enrolled in the white school. Id. The Court
noted that "transition to a unitary, nonracial system of public education was and is the ulti-
mate end to be brought about." Id. at 436.
One of the provisions included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited federal financial
assistance from being given to discriminating programs or activities. The Department of
Health, Education and Welfare issued regulations addressing racial discrimination in federally
aided school systems as directed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1, and in the statement of policies and
guidelines, the Department's Office of Education established standards for eligibility for federal
funds of school systems in the process of desegregation. 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-80.13, 181.1-181.76
(1976). "Freedom of choice" plans were seen as acceptable under these regulations. See
Green, 391 U.S. at 433-34 n.2; see also LINo A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE 52-53, 56-57
(1976).
42. For example, the Court noted that the School Board had not taken the first step to
comply with Brown until "11 years after Brown I was decided and 10 years after Brown II
directed the making of a 'prompt and reasonable start."' Green, 391 U.S. at 438. The Court
also quoted from its opinion in Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S.
218, 234 (1964) (" 'The time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out.' "). Even though the
Court specifically stated that it did not adopt the views of the United States Commission on
Civil Rights, it did note the Commission's conclusion that among the reasons freedom of
choice plans may not work are both the fear and the reality of retaliation and hostility by the
white community against Negro families who choose to attend formerly all-white schools. Id
at 440 n.5.
43. Green at 437.
44. Green, 391 U.S. at 438 (citations omitted).
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second justification for integration, we must do as the Court commanded
and go back to Brown I.
It is in Brown I that we find the most graphic elucidation of the
harm of de jure segregation. In one of the most quoted phrases from
Brown I, Chief Justice Warren wrote, "[t]o separate [African-American
youths] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the com-
munity that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to
be undone."4 Warren's opinion goes on to quote approvingly from the
district court in Kansas:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater
when it has the sanction of law; for the policy of separating the
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro
group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to
learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a ten-
dency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would
receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.4'
Even though the social scientists-including Dr. Kenneth Clark-also
discussed the harm that segregation inflicted on whites, it was only the
harm inflicted on blacks that the Supreme Court discussed.4" According
to the Court, the harm of de jure segregation went only one way.
The integrationist tradition as articulated by the Supreme Court is
therefore based upon two premises: distrust and lawlessness of whites
and cognitive, psychological, educational, and emotional harm inflicted
on African Americans by segregation. Mutual respect by the peoples of
45. Professor Derrick Bell has noted that proponents of integration quoted this phrase
over and over to justify their belief that integration provides the proper route to equality.
Derrick Bell, The Dialectics of School Desegregation, 32 ALA. L. REv. 281, 285 (1981).
46. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494. The social science evidence cited by the Court, see id. at 494
n.l1, was specifically intended to prove that segregation produced a psychological harm to
African Americans. For discussion of recent criticism of this statement, see WILLIAM CROSS,
SHADES OF BLACK (1990).
Many commentators have expressed doubt as to whether the social science evidence cited
in Brown I actually influenced the Justices. See Edmond Calm, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 150, 157 n.16 (1955) (citing Will Maslow, Address, The Uses of Law in th; Struggle for
Equality, Atlantic City, N.J. (Dec. 1954)); RALPH Ross & ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, THE
FABRIC OF SOCIETY, 165-166 (1957).
47. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494 (quoting from the opinion of the District Court in the Kan-
sas case) (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy's opinion in Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430,
1443 (1992), quotes this passage from Brown I as well.
48. As discussed by Professor Cummings, the Deutscher and Chein survey noted that
83% of the social scientists maintained that racial segregation "has detrimental psychological
effects on members of the privileged group." Cummings, supra note 1, at n.31 and accompany-
ing text.
different cultures was not a basis for integration. If such mutual respect
had existed, then the justifications for forced integration would not have
been present.49
Ill. Legal Arguments of the Racial Realist
In an inversion of the liberal-integrationist tradition, the Racial
Realists are actually employing the underlying rationale of those two tra-
ditions to justify the implementation of educational initiatives for African
Americans, including All Male Black Schools. By supporting parents'
right to choose to place their children in All Black Male Schools, the
Realists are attempting to respect the liberal tradition's requirement that
government treat people as individuals. On the other hand, while not
arguing for integration, they are drawing on the integrationist tradition
as well. Since Afrocentric educational initiatives are generally sponsored
for areas where the student body is already predominantly black, the
concern about white lawlessness and resistance is minimal. Racial Real-
ists are therefore forced to articulate as the basis for their educational
decision the other fundamental premise of the integrationist traditions,
namely, that African-Americans-particularly males-are emotionally,
psychologically and educationally scarred people.50 Consistent with the
liberal-integrationist traditions, they try to treat African-American males
as individuals but classify them as educational deviants in need of special
assistance. 51
Racial Realists are showing us that the ideological framework that
justified forced integration can be stood on its head and used to justify
voluntary separation. We are bearing witness to a process by which our
society may be moving from de jure segregation to forced integration to
voluntary separation in public schools. The one aspect that has remained
constant is that the proponents of each of these movements have at-
tempted to justify them by referring to the deeply rooted belief in the
dominant American culture that African Americans are, in some impor-
tant ways, "less than" Caucasians. The real problem with our debate
about educational initiatives for African Americans, including All Black
Male Schools, is that both proponents and opponents can not escape the
discourse of racial inferiority which the legal system seems to require.
49. For a complete discussion of the requirements of eliminating the vestiges of de jure
segregation, see Brown supra note 24, at 30-35.
50. This is often asserted as a compelling state interest for racially motivated actions since
Supreme Court's holding in City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
51. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court's de jure segregation jurisprudence
worked to stigmatize African Americans through the remedies for de jure segregation see
Brown, supra note 24.
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What is perhaps most tragic about the discussion regarding educa-
tional initiatives for African Americans is that these discussions do not
need to take on this pejorative framework. I suspect that proponents of
these schools are actually motivated by legitimate educational considera-
tions. Because public education is primarily a socializing institution, en-
culturation is a necessary part of education. The Supreme Court has
noted in a number of cases that the primary purpose of education is the
inculcation of fundamental American values.52 Racial Realist educators
are recognizing an idea that is becoming an accepted premise in the edu-
cational literature.5 3 If considerations of African-American culture are
banished from the development and implementation of educational poli-
cies, practices, and strategies, then black students will suffer. 4
Because white segregationists used arguments of African-American
inferiority to justify de jure segregation in public schools, 55 our legal sys-
tem tends to view these educational decisions as racially motivated deci-
sions. While the Supreme Court generally shields educational decisions
from judicial review, 56 race-motivated decisions can invoke strict scru-
52. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel School Dist. v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 222 n.20 (1982); and Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
53. See, e.g., MINORITY STATUS AND SCHOOLING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF IMMI-
GRANT AND INVOLUNTARY MINORITIES (John U. Ogbu & M.A. Gibson eds. 1991); JAMES A.
BANKS, MULTIETHNIC EDUCATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 12 (2d ed. 1988).
54. One researcher examining the performance of high achieving African-American stu-
dents noted, for example, that for them to succeed in public schools they were forced to de-
velop a raceless persona. Signithia Fordham, Racelessness as a Factor in Black Students'
School Success: Pragmatic Strategy or Pyrrhic Victory? 58 HARV. EDUC. REV. 54 (1988) (dis-
cussing impact of race on high achieving black students). See also. Martha Minnow, Justice
Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 32 (1987) (discussing the dilemma of difference inherent
in evaluating individuals); RAY C. RiST, THE INVISIBLE CHILDREN: SCHOOL INTEGRATION
IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1978) (The author followed a group of young black children bused to
an upper-class mainly white school. The principal applied a policy of treating all kids alike,
which meant that the black kids were expected to perform and behave no differently than the
white children from the comfortable suburbs. The result was disastrous for the black
children).
55. See, e.g. JAMES J. KILPATRICK, THE SOUTHERN CASE FOR SCHOOL SEGREGATION
(1962); I.A. NEWBY, CHALLENGE TO THE COURT: SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND THE DEFENSE
OF SEGREGATION, 1954-1966 (1967).
56. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (upholding the
authority of public school officials to censor a student newspaper); see also Board of Education
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (applying a lower
standard of reasonableness for searches conducted by school officials to determine their consis-
tency with the fourth amendment); Mark G. Yudof, A Battle for Students' Hearts and Minds,
126 NEW JERSEY L. J. (index page 1388) 21 (nov. 22, 1990); but see Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding free speech rights of students
over objections of public school administrators).
tiny.57 Once strict scrutiny is invoked, it is necessary to have a compel-
ling state interest in order to justify such decisionmaking. Consistent
with the arguments that provided the foundations for integration, Racial
Realists are forced by the legal system to cast African Americans as pas-
sive victims in order to supply the compelling justifications for race-based
decisionmaking 58 In fact, just as the NAACP lawyers discovered in
Brown, the more deplorable they portray the educational condition of
African Americans, the more likely it is that a court will find a compel-
ling state interest.
Conclusion
Racial Realists who are trying to implement educational initiatives
for African Americans are not comparing voluntary separation to inte-
grated public education. Racially separate education is a reality. The
issue is whether the legal system will allow educators the flexibility and
freedom to address the educational needs of African Americans without
stigmatizing them in the process. Lawyers, educators, and judges rein-
force the idea of African-American inferiority when they justify educa-
tional initiatives for African Americans-including gender-segregated
education-by appealing to the notion that African-American males
(and females) are emotionally, educationally, and psychologically dam-
aged people.
The solution to this dilemma proposed by Professor Cummings is to
develop a synthetic jurisprudence which allows African Americans to re-
ceive what Racial Realist educators-who, unlike lawyers and judges,
are experts in educational matters-would consider an appropriate edu-
cation only in private schools. This solution would prevent public educa-
tors from addressing the inadequacies of the traditional educational
programs, which fail to address the social and educational conditions of
African Americans, even in predominantly black school systems. It
would be ironic to use the Fourteenth Amendment-the pervading pur-
57. The strict scrutiny test is often referred to as strict in appearance, but fatal in fact.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1451 (2d ed. 1988)
("When expressed as standard for judicial review, strict scrutiny is, in Professor Gunther's
formulation, "strict" in theory and usually "fatal" in fact.") (quoting Gerald Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1,8 (1972)).
58. The effect of the structure of this argument can be seen in Garrett v. Board of Educ.,
775 F. Supp. 1004, 1006. In order to convince the District Court to agree that a substantial
governmental interest existed in order to justify gender segregated schools, the school board
relied on evidence regaRding the deplorable economic and social condition of African-Ameri-
can males, by pointing to their high dropout rates, their high unemployment rates, and their
high rates of crime.
SDriniz 19931 RACIAL REALISM
796 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 20:783
pose of which was to grant to the ancestors of these African-American
students the rights necessary to assure them full citizenship 59-to justify
keeping black children in inappropriate educational circumstances.
Forty-five percent of African Americans under the age of 18 live in
households with incomes below the poverty line. A synthetic jurispru-
dence which allows African Americans to receive an appropriate educa-
tion only in private schools is totally unrealistic and borders on cruelty.
59. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
